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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
No attempt at contempt proceedings took place in the instant case.
Had they been attempted, the logical answer on the part of the newspapers
would have been that it was the congressional committee which
caused and stimulated the pre-trial publicity and which therefore might
be considered the proximate cause of the evil. Moreover, if the news-
papers had been silenced by contempt proceedings, an important objective
of the Congressional committee would not have been attained,18 since the
committee had stated that considerations of public interest demanded a
public investigation at that particular time.' 9  Of what value would
a public investigation be if there were no vehicle of expression to carry
the results to the public? In its larger aspects, the problem in cases
such as this is at least partially concerned with the doctrine of separation
of powers.2 0 Since contempt proceedings in cases of this type obviously
present no remedy of a practical character, the only other course of action
open is to delay the trial until public attention becomes centered upon
other matters.
The only North Dakota case dealing with such a problem was decided
in 1914. 2 1 An editor who had charged that a pending hearing in the North
Dakota Supreme Court was the result of a plot to hold a fake hearing
before an approaching election was convicted of contempt of court. In
its opinion the court said, "Surely there must come a time when the rights
of the free speaker are overshadowed by the rights of other men to
unhampered justice." 22
ALBERT M. CIRISTOPHER
EQUITY - INTERLOCUTORY MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS - NEGATIVE DE-
CREE ORDERING DEFENDANTS TO CEASE FROM REFRAINING TO PURCHASE
ADVERTISING SPACE. - The plaintiff was engaged in the publication of
news in interstate commerce. The defendants, owners and operators of
hotels and restaurants in the area, jointly decided to discontinue adver-
tising in the plaintiff's newspaper, thereby threatening its continued pub-
lication. Plaintiff brought action under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act on
the theory that the discontinuance of his paper would create a monopoly
in the only other paper in the vicinity. On Plaintiff's motion for a prelim-
inary injunction the court held that an interlocutory injunction having the
mandatory effect of ordering Defendant to continue advertising in Plain-
tiffs newspaper would be issued. Greenspun v. McCarran, 105 F.Supp.
66 (D.Nev. 1952).
In this case the use of the extraordinary power of the court when act-
ing as a court of equity appears to have been carried to an unprecedented
extreme. Relief by affirmative mandatory injunction was at one time
is prosecuted by a politician before a political judge. Actually trial by newspaper
could be stopped if judges, even those who are not elected, would use the contempt
powers that are in their hands. See Perry, The Courts, the Press, and the Public,
30 MictL. Rev. 228 (1951).
18. Cf. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
19. See Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 110, 114 (1st Cir. 1952).
20. Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
21. State v. Nelson, 29 N.D. 155, 150 N.W. 267 (1914).
22. Id. at 162, 150 N.W. at 269.
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considered, beyond the power of a court of equity.' There were times
however when the early chancery judges found their respect for pre-
cedent outweighed by their sense of justice and in such cases they often
phrased a mandatory injunction in the negative form, ordering the de-
fendant to refrain from not doing the questioned act.2  Later this form
was dropped in favor of the directly worded decree, 3 though the instant
case shows that the former practice still persists. Courts were even :nore
reluctant to employ the interlocutory mandatory injunction and occasion-
ally asserted that such relief could not be given under any circumstances.
4
Courts are still extremely reluctant to grant a mandatory injunction before
there has been a full hearing of the issues.5 However Where only ",his
special relief can save a complainant from great and irreparable injury,"
most modem courts would issue mandatory injunctions on preliminary
motion, subject to certain rules and limitations.7
A rule applied by a number of courts is that this extraordinary relief
will not be decreed unless it is necessary to maintain the status quo, 8
or as asserted by some courts, where the status to be maintained is one
of action and not of rest. 9  Several courts have issued' interlocutory
mandatory injunctions where the defendant secretly altered his status while
the aid of equity was being invoked 10 or in anticipation of the court's
intervention." It is generally agreed that such relief will be granted where
1. See Smith v. Smith, L. R. 20 Eq. 500, 504 (1875) (defendant ordered to.
remove wall that obstructed light).
2. Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. Jun. 192, 32 Eng. Rep. 818 (1804) (negative "n-
junction granted ordering defendant to repair canal); Robinson v. Lord Byron, 1 Brown
C.C. 589, 28 Eng. Rep. 1315 (1785) (defendant ordered to control the flow of
water from a lake on his property). But see Rolt v. Lord Sommerville, 22 Eng. Rep.
644 (1737); Vane v. Lord Barnard,'2 Vern. 739, 23 Eng. Rep. 1082 (1716) (for two
very early cases allowing what appear to be directly worded mandatory injunctions).
3. Keys v. Alligood, 178 N.C. 16, 20, 100 S.E. 113, 115 (1919) (injunction
granted) "Why not call this process by its right name. instead of granting what is
really mandatory, under the guise of preventive relief?"; Smith v. Smith, L.R. 20
Eq. 500 (1875).
4. Audenried v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 68 Pa. 370, 376 (1871) (citing
cases ).
5. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Rader, 160 Fla. 700, 36 So.2d 270 (1948)
(injunction denied); State v. Gillam, 188 Okla. 10, 105 P.2d 773, 775 (1940) (de-
cision granting injunction upheld in part) "ordinarily and generally such relief should
not be granted prior to a final hearing of controversy ....
6. United States v. Adler's Creamery, 107 F.2d 987 (2nd Cir. 1939) (decision
granting injunction reversed) (no danger of irreparable injury), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 657 (1940); State v. Baker, 112 W.Va. 263, 164 S.E. 154 (1932) (necessity
and extreme hardship); accord, L. & L. Concession Co. v. Goldhan-Zimner Theater
Enterprises, 332 Mich. 382, 51 N.W.2d 918 (1952) (serious inconvenience and
loss to plaintiff with no great loss to defendant).
7. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 83 F.Supp.
860 (D. Minn. 1949) (defendant ordered to furnish refrigerator cars for perishable
goods); Marks v. Golden Horn Realty Co., 92 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1949) (defendant
ordered to provide doorman service as in the past); see In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 556
(1896); Bissel v. Olsen, 26 N.D. 60, 76, 143 N.W. 340, 346 (1913) (requiring
a strong case).
8. United States v. Adler's Creamery, 107 F.2d 987 (2nd Cir. 1939), cert denied,
311 U.S. 657 (1940) L. & L. Concession Co. v. Goldhan-Zimner Theater Enter-
prises, 332 Mich. 382, 51 N.W.2d 918 (1952).
9. Texas Pipeline Co. v. Burton Drilling Co., 54 S.W. 190 (Tex.Civ.App. 1932)
(defendants ordered to continue transporting oil through pipeline).
10. Mutual Oil Co. v. Empire Petroleum Co., 5 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1925);
O'Donnell v. Lehigh Nay. Coal Co., 324 Pa. 369, 188 Atl. 348 (1936) (order to
replace part of railroad siding).
11. Whitman v. Fayette Fuel Gas Co., 139 Pa. 492, 20 At. 1062 (1891)
(order to continue supplying natural gas).
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the defendant has changed his status in violation of a prohibitory injunc-
tion.1 2
Courts which grant preliminary mandatory injunctions are almost un-
animous in holding that the right violated must be an extremely clear one,'
there must be great urgency for immediate relief,1 4 and the damage must
be irreparable and continuing.1 5 Some courts have held that a mandatory
injunction will not be granted on a preliminary motion where that decree
would give the complainant all the relief he could obtain on a final hear-
ing,'Q but a few courts which follow this rule have allowed exceptions.,
In general the rules which govern the granting of other types of injunc-
tive relief will also govern the granting of a mandatory injunction on an
interlocutory application.
It would be well to reconsider the instant case in the light of the rules
stated. The injunction here was sought to prevent injury from an alleged
violation of the Anti-Trust Act.' 8 This Act gives an injured party the right to an
injunction to restrain violations of the Act,19 but the Supreme Court has said that
the injunctive relief is available only where the complainant can show special
injury.2 0 The court found as facts in the instant case that the complainant
had suffered special injury in its loss of revenue from the wrongfully re-
fused advertising, and that if this loss were to continue the injury would
be irreparable in that Plaintiff's ability to continue in the newspaper busi-
ness would be endangered. This finding would place the case well within
the rule requiring great urgency for relief. If the complainant is entitled
to an injunction to maintain the status quo there seems to be little doubt
that the only injunction which will suffice is one of a mandatory type.
It is the nature of the acts ordered to be performed that distinguishes
the instant decision from previous cases. The defendant is, in effect, ordered
to continue buying advertising space in Plaintiff's publication. There are
a number of cases in which persons have been ordered to perform certain
private duties2' or provide services,22 but a search reveals no cases in
12. Elder v. Barnes, 219 N.C. .411, :14 S.E.2d 249 (1941) (order to clear
ditch); Vicksburg S.&P. R. Co. v. Webster Sand, Gravel and Construction Co., 132
La. 1051, 62 So. 140 (1913) (spur track removed in violation of injunction).
13. Sims v. Stuart, 291 Fed. 707 (S.DN.Y. 1922); Pansmith v. Island Park.
64 N.Y.S.2d. 741 (1946). But cf. Trautwein v. Moreno Mutual Irrigation Co., 22
F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1927) (injunction granted) "The right of the plaintiffs
to the injunction granted is not entirely clear."
14. Coe v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 3 Fed. 775 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1880) (injunc-
tion granted) (not to be granted unless the urgency of the case demands it); see
Local Union No. 57 Brotherhood of P., D. & P. H. v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16
So.2d 705, 711 (1944) (union ordered to reinstate former member).
15. Watson v. Burnett, 216 Ind. 216, 23 N.E.2d 420 (1939).
16. Sims v. Stuart, 291 Fed. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (injunction denied); Clean-
ing & Dyeing Plant Owners Ass'n. v. Sterling Cleaners & Dyers, 278 Ill. App. 70
(1934) (injunction denied) (attempt to stop price war by injunction).
17. Texas Pipeline Co. v. Burton Drilling Co.,., 54 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932) (injunction granted; where status quo is a condition of action and a condi-
tion of rest will inflict irreparable injury); see Moss Industries v. Irving Metals Co..
140 N.J. Eq. 484, 55 A.2d 30, 32 (injunction denied) (injunction will be granted
where right to relief is clear and certain).
18. 15 U.S.C. §1, 2 (1946).
19. 15 U.S.C. §26 (1946).
20. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904).
21. Elder v. Barnes, 219 N.C. 411, 14 S.E.2d 249 (1941) (clear a ditch drain-
ing plaintiff's property); O'Donnell v. Lehigh Nev. Coal Co., 342 Pa. 369, 188 Atl.
348 (1936) (replace part of a railroad siding).
22. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 83 F. Supp.
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which anyone has been ordered, by an interlocutory decree, to purchase
either intangible personal property or services. The lack of precedent coupled
with the caution with which most courts grant interlocutory mandatory in-
junctions would seem to render this case questionable as authority for
future decisions.
ROBERT N. OPLAND
INTERNAL REVENUE - NATURE AND EXTENT OF TAXING POWER-POW-
ER TO TAX AND REGULATE-Defendants were convicted for failure to
pay a gamblers' occupational tax imposed by an act of Congress.' The
act levied a special tax of $50 per year on every person engaged in receiv-
ing wagers for or on behalf of any person liable to a tax on wagers. In
addition the act required every person subject to the tax to register with
the appropriate Collector of Internal Revenue and in connection with
his registration to furnish certain information specified in the act. De-
fendants challenged the validity of the act contending that it was not de-
signed as a revenue measure but that its true purpose was to obtain in-
formation concerning gambling activities and thereby assist the states in
enforcing the criminal law against gamblers. On appeal it was held that
the judiciary is without power to scrutinize the motives and purposes
of the legislative branch of the government, and since the government was
in fact deriving an income from the tax, it was a valid exercise of
Congress' power to tax. United States v. Robinson, 107 F. Supp. 38
(E.D. Mich. 1952).
The power to tax granted Congress by the Constitution is extremely
broad.- This power is not restricted by either the Fifth 3 or Tenth Am-
endment. 4 It is not outside the ambit of Congressional power to levy
taxes which possess some incidental regulatory, suppressive or restrictive
effect.5 Nor is a primarily regulatory statute which in fact raises revenue
invalid so long as the act falls within the scope of powers delegated to
Congress.6 But where the primary purpose of the act, obviously hidden
under the cloak of the taxing power, has infringed upon the residual
powers of the states, the decisions have not been in complete accord. A
recent Supreme Court decision upheld an act of Congress in which the
860 (D. Minn. 1949) (defendant ordered to furnish refrigerator cars); Marks v.
Golden Horn Realty Co., 92 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1949) (provide doorman service).
1. 26 U.S.C. §3290.
2. U.S. Const. Art. 1, §8; see License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471 (U.S. 1866)
taxing power limited only by rule of apportionment of direct taxes, rule of uniformity
of indirect taxes, and prohibition against export taxes).
3. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1915); see Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 282 U.S. 40, 44 (1934) (upheld state oleomargerine tax).
4. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (upheld federal estate tax);
sec United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1940).
5. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) "Undoubtedly every tax which
lays its burdens on some and not others may have an incidental regulatory effect.";
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) "An act of Congress which on
its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing power is not any the less so because the
tax is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed."; Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
8 Wall. 533 (U.S. 1869).
6. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940) (power of taxation
used as a sanction for exercise of commerce power); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,
596 (1884) (tax not void because used as expedient regulation of commerce); see Child
Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922).
